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Note 
 
KANSAS V. GARCIA: RESTORING HISTORIC STATE POLICE 
POWERS IN TRADITIONAL AREAS OF CRIMINAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
CHANTAE N. SIMMS* 
 
In Kansas v. Garcia,1 the United States Supreme Court addressed 
whether the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”)2 preempts states 
from prosecuting unauthorized aliens3 for identity theft based on false 
information found in federal and state tax-withholding forms, when the same 
information is also contained on a federal work-authorization form (“I-9 
form”).4  The Court held that the IRCA does not preempt such state 
prosecutions.5  Ultimately, the Court correctly decided the case, as federalism 
favors deference to the historic police powers of the states in a traditional 
area of criminal law.6  Further, the Court interpreted the relevant provisions 
 
© 2021 Chantae N. Simms. 
*J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The author 
wishes to thank the editors and staff of the Maryland Law Review, particularly Jamy Klotzbach, 
Brandon Wharton, Monica Kulkarni, and Lydia Jines, for their thoughtful comments, edits, and 
encouragement throughout the writing process.  The author would also like to thank Professors Max 
Stearns, Richard Boldt, and Mark Graber for their guidance, advice, and feedback on earlier drafts 
of this Note.  Finally, the author thanks her family and friends for their unwavering support and 
patience not only during this process, but throughout law school.  
 1. 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).  
 2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359.  
 3. The author recognizes that the term “alien” has long been considered a dehumanizing term 
to describe undocumented persons.  Currently, efforts are being made to move away from using the 
term, including a movement to eliminate the term from United States immigration laws and replace 
it with the word “noncitizen.”  See Nicole Acevedo, Biden Seeks to Replace ‘Alien’ with Less 
‘Dehumanizing Term’ in Immigration Laws, NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021, 3:34 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/biden-seeks-replace-alien-less-dehumanizing-term-
immigration-laws-n1255350.  However, because the term “alien” is used by the United States 
Supreme Court in Garcia as well as Title 8 of the United States Code, this Note will use the term 
“alien” for purposes of consistency. 
 4. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2) (2019) (establishing the I-9 form).  The I-9 form is a federal form 
used to “verify the identity and employment authorization of individuals hired for employment in 
the United States.”  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, I-9, Employment Eligibility 
Verification, https://www.uscis.gov/i-9 (last modified May 19, 2020).  Both employers and 
employees are required to complete the form.  8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(3) (2019). 
 5. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 804, 806.  
 6. See infra Section IV.B.  
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of the IRCA to prevent a construction that would produce absurd results,7 and 
the Court avoided inappropriate “judicial guesswork”8 into legislative 
intentions.9   
I. THE CASE 
In August 2012, following a routine traffic stop, Kansas authorities 
contacted the restaurant where Ramiro Garcia worked to obtain his 
employment application.10  A joint state-federal investigation revealed that 
the Social Security number Garcia used on his I-9 form, federal tax-
withholding form (“W-4 form”), and state tax-withholding form (“K-4 
form”) belonged to a Texas woman.11 As a result, Garcia was charged with 
identity theft under Kansas law.12  Prior to trial, Garcia, relying on the IRCA’s 
express preemption provision,13 successfully moved to suppress the I-9 form 
that he filled out during the hiring process.14  Next, Garcia moved to suppress 
the W-4 form, arguing that “the information contained on the I-9 [form] was 
transferred to [the] W-4 form.”15  But the district court refused to suppress 
the W-4 form.16  Thus, the W-4 and K-4 forms—both containing the same 
fraudulent Social Security number—were admitted into evidence.17  Garcia 
was subsequently found guilty of identity theft.18 
Similarly, a joint state-federal investigation of Donaldo Morales 
revealed that Morales had used a Social Security number belonging to 
another person on his I-9, W-4, and K-4 forms when he applied for work at 
a Kansas restaurant.19  While the State agreed not to rely on the I-9 form as a 
basis for prosecution, the tax-withholding forms were admitted into 
 
 7. See infra Section IV.C. 
 8. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 (Thomas, J., concurring).   
 9. See infra Section IV.D. 
 10. State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588, 590 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).  
 11. Id.   
 12. Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6107(a)(1) (2019) (criminalizing “using . . . any personal 
identifying information . . . belonging to or issued to another person, with the intent to . . . [d]efraud 
that person, or anyone else, in order to receive any benefit”).  
 13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) (limiting the use of the I-9 form and “any information contained 
in or appended to” the form “for purposes other than” enforcing the IRCA and other specified 
provisions of federal law).  
 14. Garcia, 401 P.3d at 590.   
 15. Id.   
 16. Id.   
 17. Id. at 591.  
 18. Id.  
 19. State v. Morales, 401 P.3d 155, 156 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020). 
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evidence.20  Consequently, Morales was charged and convicted of identity 
theft and making false information.21   
Finally, Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara became the focus of an investigation 
after officers determined that he had used a Social Security number issued to 
another individual to lease an apartment in Kansas.22  Officers subsequently 
contacted the restaurant where Ochoa-Lara worked and reviewed his 
completed I-9 and W-4 forms, which included the same false Social Security 
number.23  The I-9 form was not used to prosecute Ochoa-Lara, but the W-4 
form was admitted into evidence.24  Ochoa-Lara was then found guilty of 
state identity theft.25 
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed Garcia’s conviction, holding that 
state prosecutions for identity theft based on fraudulent documents that 
include the same false information found in an unauthorized alien’s I-9 form 
are expressly preempted by the IRCA.26  The court concluded that the plain 
language of Section 1324a(b)(5) expressly preempted the use of the I-9 form 
and “any information contained in” the form for purposes other than those 
listed in the provision.27  Because the fraudulent Social Security number 
contained in Garcia’s tax-withholding forms also appeared on his I-9 form, 
the court found the State’s argument that it had not actually relied on the I-9 
form irrelevant.28  Concurring, Justice Luckert agreed that Section 
1324a(b)(5) preempted Garcia’s prosecution, but through the doctrines of 
field and conflict preemption rather than express preemption.29   
 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5824 (2019) (criminalizing, among other things, “making, 
generating, distributing or drawing . . . any written instrument . . . with knowledge that such 
information falsely states or represents some material matter . . . and with intent to defraud, obstruct 
the detection of a theft or felony offense or induce official action”).   
 22. State v. Ochoa-Lara, 401 P.3d 159, 160 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 161.  
 26. State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588, 599–600 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).  
 27. Id. at 599.  The IRCA limits the use of the I-9 form and “any information contained in or 
appended to” the form to enforcement of the INA and a handful of other federal statutes, including 
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), § 1028 (identity theft), § 1546 (immigration-document fraud), 
and § 1621 (perjury).  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5).  
 28. Garcia, 401 P.3d at 599.   
 29. Id. at 600 (Luckert, J., concurring).  Unlike express preemption, field and conflict 
preemption do not require statutory language explicitly prohibiting states from enacting or enforcing 
a specified type of law.  Id.  Instead, field preemption occurs when Congress occupies a regulatory 
field through comprehensive legislation, clearly intending for the field to be regulated exclusively 
by the federal government.  1 JACOB A. STEIN, GLEN A. MITCHELL, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
§ 2.02 (Matthew Bender ed., 2020).  Conflict preemption arises where “it is impossible for a party 
to comply with both federal and state requirements” or when a state law operates as an obstacle to 
the implementation of a federal statutory scheme.  Id.  Whereas the majority found express 
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Based on its holding in State v. Garcia,30 the court also reversed the 
convictions of Morales and Ochoa-Lara.31  The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to address whether the IRCA preempts state prosecutions 
of unauthorized aliens who use false identities on tax-withholding forms 
when the same fraudulent information also appears in an I-9 form.32 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States Constitution makes clear the federal government’s 
supremacy in the field of foreign affairs, including its power over 
immigration, naturalization, and deportation of aliens.33  When the federal 
government promulgates “by treaty or statute . . . established rules and 
regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of 
aliens . . . the treaty or statute is the supreme law of the land.”34  Pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause, when Congress acts within its enumerated authority, 
it has the power to preempt state law.35  To implement the Supremacy Clause, 
the Supreme Court has developed various preemption principles that are 
relevant to the Court’s Garcia decision.36  Section II.A discusses the 
enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the precursor to 
the IRCA.37  Section II.B describes the framework of the IRCA and its 
employment verification system.38  Section II.C explains the contours of 
preemption doctrine.39  Finally, Section II.D explores the approaches taken 
by other state and lower federal courts regarding preemption questions 
involving aliens prosecuted for using false information and documents in 
employment-related contexts.40  
 
preemption language in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5), Justice Luckert observed no explicit language in 
the statute preempting state civil or criminal proceedings against employees.  Garcia, 401 P.3d at 
600–01 (Luckert, J., concurring).  
 30. 401 P.3d 588 (Kan. 2017). 
 31. State v. Morales, 401 P.3d 155, 157 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020); State v. 
Ochoa-Lara, 401 P.3d 159, 161 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).  
 32. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2020).  
 33. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The 
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform [sic] [r]ule of [n]aturalization . . . .”).  
 34. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62–63.  
 35. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing 
that federal law “shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and; and the [j]udges in every [s]tate shall be 
bound thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or [l]aws of any [s]tate to the [c]ontrary 
notwithstanding”).  
 36. State v. Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 746 (Iowa 2017) (citing Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n 
v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982)).  
 37. See infra Section II.A.  
 38. See infra Section II.B.  
 39. See infra Section II.C.  
 40. See infra Section II.D.  
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A. The Enactment of the INA   
The INA is the foundation of the United States’ immigration and 
naturalization laws.41  The INA is a “comprehensive federal statutory scheme 
for regulation of immigration and naturalization,” which sets “the terms and 
conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens 
lawfully in the country.”42  The INA “provides criteria by which 
‘aliens’ . . . may enter, visit and reside in the country.”43  Moreover, the INA 
sets forth the “sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an 
alien” should be admitted to or removed from the United States.44  As 
originally enacted, employment of illegal entrants was a “peripheral concern” 
of the INA, and the Supreme Court originally held that states were not 
precluded from regulating the employment of aliens pursuant to their police 
powers.45  
B. The Enactment of the IRCA and the Requirements of its Employment 
Verification System  
In 1986, Congress supplemented the INA by enacting the IRCA, which 
established a comprehensive scheme that “made combating the employment 
of illegal aliens” in the United States “central to ‘[t]he policy of immigration 
law.’”46  The major purpose of enacting the IRCA was to regain control over 
the Nation’s borders.47  Congress concluded that “[t]he primary incentive for 
illegal immigration is the availability of [employment in the United 
States].”48  To reduce this incentive, the IRCA imposes sanctions on 
employers who knowingly hire unauthorized aliens.49  According to the 
 
 41. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), amended by Act of Oct. 
3, 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  
 42. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353, 359 (1976), superseded by statute, 8 
U.S.C. §  1324a(h)(2).  
 43. State v. Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 743 (Iowa 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). 
 44. Id. at 744 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3)). 
 45. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360, 362.  Police powers describe the states’ authority to enact laws 
that protect the health, safety, morals, and welfare of their citizens.  See Santiago Legarre, The 
Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 793–94 (2007) (“[I]nsofar 
as the expression is used in American constitutional law, the phrase ‘police power’ normally refers 
to the authority of the states for the promotion of public health, public safety, public morals, and 
public welfare.”).  
 46. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (alteration in 
original) (quoting INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rts., Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991)).  
 47. 131 CONG. REC. 23,317 (1985); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,205 (May 1, 1987) (“[The IRCA], the most 
comprehensive reform of our immigration laws since the enactment of the [INA] in 1952, reflects a 
resolve to strengthen law enforcement to control illegal immigration.”).  
 48. 131 CONG. REC. 23,317 (1985); S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 1 (1985); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986) (“Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally . . . .”). 
 49. 131 CONG. REC. 23,317 (1985).   
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House Committee on the Judiciary, imposing sanctions would deter 
employers from hiring unauthorized aliens, which in turn would deter aliens 
from entering the country illegally in search of employment.50  Further, the 
Committee explained that Congress intended for the IRCA to preempt only 
a narrow class of state laws—those providing for “civil fines and/or criminal 
sanctions on the hiring, recruitment or referral of undocumented aliens.”51  
Accordingly, the IRCA established an “employment verification 
system” to curtail the employment of unauthorized aliens.52  Using the I-9 
form, “employer[s] must attest under penalty of perjury” that they “‘verified 
that [an employee] is not an unauthorized alien’” after reviewing approved 
documents, such as an employee’s United States passport or resident alien 
card.53  Employers who violate the IRCA may face civil and/or criminal 
penalties.54  However, states are expressly preempted from “imposing civil 
or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)” against 
employers who hire unauthorized aliens.55  
The IRCA also imposes duties on employees, requiring employees to 
“attest” on the I-9 form that they are lawfully able to work in the United 
States.56  The IRCA does not impose criminal sanctions on aliens who seek 
or engage in unauthorized work, and the Supreme Court has held that states 
are impliedly preempted from criminalizing such conduct.57  But the IRCA 
does impose civil and criminal penalties on aliens who commit document 
fraud to show authorization to work.58   
Finally, the IRCA limits the use of “any information contained in or 
appended to” an I-9 form for purposes other than enforcing the IRCA and 
other specified provisions of federal law.59  The IRCA also limits the use of 
 
 50. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986).  The Committee explained that it was convinced 
that imposing employer sanctions was “the most humane, credible and effective way to respond to 
the large-scale influx of undocumented aliens.”  Id.  
 51. Id. at 58.  
 52. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).  
 53. Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 589 (2011) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)–
(D)).  
 54. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A), (f)(1).  Depending on the number of previous violations, an 
employer who violates the IRCA shall be ordered to pay a civil fine ranging from $250 to $10,000 
for each unauthorized worker with respect to whom a violation occurred.  Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A).  In 
terms of criminal penalties, employers who engage in a pattern of violations shall be fined up to 
$3,000 for each undocumented employee and imprisoned for up to six months.  Id. § 1324a(f)(1). 
 55. Id. § 1324a(h)(2).  
 56. Id. § 1324a(b)(2).  
 57. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 403–07 (2012).  
 58. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324c(a)(1)–(4), (d)(3), 1546(b).   
 59. Id. § 1324a(b)(5). 
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the employment verification system, more broadly, for “law enforcement 
purposes” other than enforcing the IRCA and its provisions.60  
C. The Development of the Various Preemption Doctrines  
The United States Supreme Court has established two categories of 
preemption: express and implied.61  Express preemption occurs when a 
statute’s text clearly states that congressional authority is exclusive,62 while 
implied preemption involves drawing inferences as to congressional intent 
from the entirety of a legislative act.63  The Court recognizes two types of 
implied preemption: field and conflict.64   
Field preemption arises when either “the scheme of federal regulation 
[is] so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the [s]tates to supplement 
it” or where “the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will 
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”65  For 
example, in addition to immigration, the Supreme Court has held that 
Congress has occupied the field of aircraft noise regulation “insofar as it 
involves controlling the flight of aircraft.”66  In City of Burbank v. Lockheed 
Air Terminal, Inc.,67 the City Council of Burbank, California, in an attempt 
to reduce airport noise, adopted an ordinance making it unlawful for a “pure 
jet aircraft” to take off from a local airport between the hours of 11:00 P.M. 
and 7:00 A.M.68  Both the federal trial court and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the ordinance unconstitutional on 
Supremacy Clause grounds, and the Supreme Court affirmed.69  Although it 
found no express preemption provision in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 
as amended, the Court explained that the “pervasive nature of the scheme of 
federal regulation of aircraft noise” supported a conclusion of preemption.70  
Further, the Court recognized that the Act requires a “delicate balance 
between safety and efficiency . . . and the protection of persons on the 
 
 60. Id. § 1324a(d)(2)(F). 
 61. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 (1982). 
 62. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).  
 63. See id. (explaining preemption “is compelled [where] Congress’[s] command 
is . . . implicitly contained in [a statute’s] structure and purpose”).  
 64. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 376–77 (2015).  
 65. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  
 66. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633–35 (1973) (quoting 
Letter from Alan S. Boyd, Sec’y of Transp., to Senate Comm. on Com. (June 22, 1968)).  
 67. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).  
 68. Id. at 625–26.  
 69. Id. at 626.  
 70. Id. at 628–633 (describing how the Noise Control Act of 1972 amended the Federal 
Aviation Act to vest exclusive federal control over aircraft noise in the Federal Aviation 
Administration and Environmental Protection Agency).  
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ground.”71  As such, the Court reasoned that these factors were so 
interdependent as to require a “uniform and exclusive system of federal 
regulation,” leaving “no room for local curfews or . . . controls.”72 
 On the other hand, conflict preemption arises when either “compliance 
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility”73 or when 
a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”74  For example, in Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council,75 the Supreme Court relied on obstacle 
preemption to invalidate Massachusetts’s Burma law.76  There, the state law 
barred state agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies 
doing business with Burma.77  Three months after the law was enacted, 
Congress adopted a statute imposing federal sanctions on Burma.78  The 
federal statute also authorized the President to impose additional sanctions or 
waive sanctions, subject to certain conditions.79  Further, the federal statute 
directed the President to develop a comprehensive and multilateral strategy 
addressing democracy, human rights practices, and the quality of life in 
Burma.80  Applying obstacle preemption principles, the Court held that the 
Massachusetts law was “an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s 
full objectives under the federal Act.”81  The Court explained that Congress 
went to great lengths “to provide the President with flexible and effective 
authority over economic sanctions against Burma.”82  Moreover, the Court 
determined that Congress intended to limit the economic pressure on the 
Burmese government to a precise range.83  Yet the Massachusetts law used 
different economic leverage, penalizing conduct that Congress specifically 
exempted or excluded from sanctions.84  Finally, the Court found that the 
 
 71. Id. at 638–39.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).  
 74. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
 75. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).  
 76. Id. at 373, 388.  
 77. Id. at 367.  
 78. Id. at 368.  The statute included three sanctions: (1) a ban on all aid to the Burmese 
government, except for humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics efforts, and promotions of 
human rights and democracy; (2) a mandate instructing United States representatives to 
international financial institutions to vote against loans or other assistance to or for Burma; and (3) 
a restriction on entry visas to Burmese government officials.  Id. 
 79. Id. at 369.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 373.  
 82. Id. at 374–76.  
 83. Id. at 377.  
 84. Id. at 378.  
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state law interfered with the President’s ability to speak on behalf of the 
United States when dealing with foreign governments.85  For these reasons, 
the Court held that the Massachusetts law stood as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of Congress’s full purposes and objectives and, therefore, 
was preempted.   
D. Other State and Lower Federal Court Treatment of Preemption 
Questions Involving Aliens and Identity Theft Laws  
Many states have laws prohibiting fraud, forgery, and identity theft.86  
While these statutes are perfect examples of state exercises of police power, 
the enactment of the IRCA has caused them to become the subject of 
numerous challenges as applied87 to unauthorized aliens seeking 
employment.88   
Courts have reached opposite conclusions regarding as-applied 
challenges to these laws.89  For example, in State v. Diaz-Rey,90 the Missouri 
Court of Appeals addressed whether the State was preempted from 
prosecuting an unauthorized alien for forgery based on his use of a false 
Social Security number on an employment application.91  There, the State 
charged Pablo Gilberto Diaz-Rey, an unauthorized employee, with violating 
Missouri’s forgery statute by using a false Social Security number on an 
employment document.92  Diaz-Rey filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
based on Arizona v. United States,93 states were prohibited from enacting 
laws “making it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage 
in work,” and that he was being charged with the same conduct.94  The state 
 
 85. Id. at 381–82.  
 86. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 798 (2020).  
 87. There are two basic types of preemption challenges: facial and as-applied.  Nat’l Inst. of 
Family & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2391 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  To prevail 
on a facial challenge, a party “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the 
Act would be valid.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  In contrast, to prevail on 
an as-applied challenge, a party must demonstrate that a state law is unconstitutional when applied 
in the circumstances of their case.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2391 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).   
 88. See, e.g., Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016) (challenging 
Arizona’s employment-related identity theft laws for violating the Supremacy Clause); State v. 
Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 742 (Iowa 2017) (challenging an alien’s prosecution under Iowa’s 
identity theft and forgery statutes).  
 89. See Martinez, 896 N.W.2d at 751–54 (identifying inconsistent applications of preemption 
principles by lower federal courts in cases involving aliens and employment).  
 90. 397 S.W.3d 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).  
 91. Id. at 7–8. 
 92. MO. REV. STAT. § 570.090 (2017).  
 93. 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 94. Diaz-Rey, 397 S.W.3d at 7–8. 
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trial court agreed and dismissed the charges on grounds that the prosecution 
was preempted by the IRCA.95  On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that the forgery prosecution was neither expressly nor 
impliedly preempted by federal law.96   
In its implied preemption discussion, the court emphasized that where 
“it is alleged that preemption applies in an area . . . that has been traditionally 
occupied by the states, a preemption review starts with th[e] assumption” that 
state police powers are not superseded unless Congress has made its 
preemptive intent “clear and manifest.”97  While acknowledging that the 
“IRCA provides a comprehensive framework for combating the employment 
of illegal aliens,” the court found that the Missouri forgery statute did not 
intrude into the employment of unauthorized aliens.98  Further, the court held 
that the forgery statute did not conflict with the IRCA, as the forgery statute 
did not “criminalize activity that Congress ha[d] decided not to 
criminalize.”99  Rather than imposing sanctions on unauthorized aliens for 
performing work,100 the statute merely “criminalize[d] the use of inauthentic 
writings or items as genuine with knowledge and intent to defraud.”101 
On the other hand, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the enforcement 
of identity theft and forgery statutes as applied to unauthorized aliens who 
commit fraud to obtain employment is preempted by federal law.102  In State 
v. Martinez,103 Martha Martinez, an unauthorized alien, was charged with 
identity theft and forgery for providing her employer with a fictitious driver’s 
license and Social Security card during the hiring process.104  Martinez filed 
a motion to dismiss on the basis that the IRCA preempted her prosecution.105  
The state trial court denied the motion.106   
 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 8–11.  The court determined that the forgery statute was not expressly preempted by 
the IRCA “because [the forgery statute] does not sanction those who employ, recruit, or offer for 
employment unauthorized aliens.”  Id. at 8–9. 
 97. Id. at 9 (quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400).  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 10.  
 100. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 405–06 (holding that states may not criminalize unauthorized 
aliens for performing work because the IRCA illustrates a deliberate choice by Congress “not to 
impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment”).  
 101. Diaz-Rey, 397 S.W.3d at 10.  
 102. State v. Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 754–57 (Iowa 2017).   
 103. 896 N.W.2d 737 (Iowa 2017).   
 104. Id. at 741–42.   
 105. Id. at 742.  
 106. Id. 
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On interlocutory review, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that 
Martinez’s prosecution for identity theft107 was field and conflict preempted 
by the IRCA.108  With respect to field preemption, the court explained that 
“the IRCA establishes a comprehensive regime of criminal, civil, and 
immigration related consequences,”109 forming “a system that can work as a 
‘harmonious whole.’”110  As such, the court reasoned that “federal 
immigration law occupies the field regarding the employment of 
unauthorized aliens,” and thus, the State could not prosecute Martinez for 
identity theft related to the fraudulent documents she provided to her 
employer as an unauthorized alien.111  The court also found that the identity 
theft prosecution was conflict preempted, as the prosecution would 
“frustrate[] congressional purpose and provide[] an obstacle to the 
implementation of federal immigration policy by usurping federal 
enforcement discretion” with respect to the employment of unauthorized 
aliens.112  Further, the court determined that enforcement of state laws 
regulating employment of unauthorized workers would lead to “inconsistent 
enforcement . . . undermin[ing] the harmonious whole of national 
immigration law.”113 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING  
In Garcia, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the 
IRCA preempts states from prosecuting aliens for identity theft based on false 
information contained in state and federal tax-withholding forms when the 
same false information is also contained in an employee’s I-9 form.114  In a 
5-4 decision, the Court held that the IRCA does not preempt states from doing 
 
 107. The court also determined that the forgery prosecution was preempted because Iowa’s 
forgery statute was a “mirror image of federal immigration law, namely 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).”  Id. 
at 754.  
 108. Id. at 755–57.  
 109. Id. at 755. 
 110. Id. (quoting Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1025 (9th Cir. 2013)).  
 111. Id. at 755–56.  
 112. Id. at 756.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2020).  Under Kansas law, every employer who is 
required to withhold federal income tax is also required to withhold state income tax.  
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3298 (2019).  To let an employer know how much Kansas income tax 
should be withheld, an employee should provide his or her employer with a signed K-4 form.  See 
KAN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 500518, FORM K-4, EMPLOYEE’S WITHHOLDING ALLOWANCE 
CERTIFICATE (2019) (instructing new employees to complete the K-4 form and give it to his or her 
employer in order to have Kansas income tax withheld).  Additionally, on or before the date on 
which an employee commences employment, the employee must provide the employer with a 
signed W-4 form for purposes of determining the proper amount of federal income taxes to withhold 
from the employee’s pay.  26 C.F.R. § 31.3402(f)(2)-1(a) (2020).   
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so.115  Because the respondents invoked all three categories of preemption,116 
the Court considered each argument in turn.117 
Every member of the Court agreed that nothing in the IRCA expressly 
preempts Kansas’s identify theft laws as applied to the respondents.118  The 
Court explained that “the mere fact that an I-9 contains an item of 
information . . . does not mean that information ‘contained in’ the I-9 is used 
whenever [that information] is later employed.”119  The Court reasoned that 
such an interpretation would lead to strange results.120  For example, if the 
Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 1324a(b)(5) were upheld, 
once an employee has stated his or her name on an I-9 form, no person could 
use that name for any other purpose.121  Thus, the employee’s name could not 
be used by a prosecutor in an indictment, an employer cutting a paycheck, or 
a family member mailing a birthday card.122  The majority then addressed the 
respondents’ reliance on Section 1324a(d)(2)(F)123 as a basis for arguing that 
their prosecutions were expressly preempted.124  The Court found this 
argument unpersuasive because the IRCA’s employment verification system 
and the completion of tax-withholding forms serve different functions in two 
entirely different systems.125  Whereas “[t]he sole function of [the federal 
employment verification system] is to establish that an employee is not 
barred from working in this country due to alienage,” completing and 
submitting tax-withholding forms help “to enforce federal and state income 
tax laws.”126 
Next, the Court turned to the respondents’ implied preemption 
arguments.127  The respondents asserted that Congress ousted states from 
regulating “the field of fraud on the federal employment verification system” 
 
 115. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 804, 806. 
 116. See supra Section II.C (explaining the various types of preemption).  
 117. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 801.   
 118. Id. at 804, 808. 
 119. Id. at 803.  The Court found the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation “contrary to 
standard English usage,” explaining that a person does not use information contained in a particular 
source unless the person actually makes use of that source.  Id. at 802.  
 120. Id. at 803.   
 121. Id. at 803.  
 122. Id.; see also infra Secition IV.C.  
 123. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(d)(2)(F) limits the use of the federal employment verification system “for 
law enforcement purposes, other than” enforcing the IRCA and the same federal statutes listed in 
§ 1324a(b)(5), i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), § 1028 (identity theft), § 1546 (immigration-
document fraud), and § 1621 (perjury).  
 124. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 803; see supra text accompanying note 60.   
 125. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 803–04.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 804. 
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or, even more broadly, “the ‘field relating to the federal employment 
verification system.’”128  The majority reiterated that the submission of tax-
withholding forms are neither part of nor related to the employment 
verification system.129  The majority also clarified that complying with the 
employment verification system and submitting tax-withholding forms 
results in different benefits.130  Furthermore, the majority explained that the 
IRCA does not preclude states from regulating information that must be 
supplied as a precondition for employment.131  
The majority concluded its field preemption analysis by distinguishing 
Arizona, finding no similarity to the consolidated case before the Court.132  
While federal immigration law exclusively occupies the field of alien 
registration,133 the majority stated that federal law has not created a similar 
“comprehensive and unified system regarding information that a [s]tate may 
require employees to provide.”134  
The majority also found no basis for holding that the Kansas statutes 
conflicted with federal law.135  First, the majority concluded that it was 
possible for employees to comply with both the IRCA and the Kansas 
statutes.136  Second, the majority again distinguished Arizona.  In Arizona, 
the Court inferred from the legislative history of the IRCA “that Congress 
made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, 
or engage in, unauthorized employment;” however, the Court explained that 
here, Congress did not decide that unauthorized aliens who use false 
identities on tax-withholding forms should be free from criminal 
prosecution.137  Rather, Congress made it a crime to use false information on 
 
 128. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Brief for Respondents at 42, Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. 
Ct. 791 (2020) (No. 17-834), 2019 WL 3776032, at *42).  
 129. Id. at 805; see supra text accompanying note 126.  
 130. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 805 (“Submitting W-4’s and K-4’s helped respondents get jobs, but 
this did not in any way assist them in showing that they were authorized to work in this country.”).  
 131. Id.    
 132. Id. at 805–06. 
 133. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 400–03 (2012) (explaining that the 
comprehensive statutory framework for the registration of aliens demonstrates that Congress has 
occupied the field of alien registration); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (holding 
that “where the federal government . . . has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein 
provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot . . . conflict or interfere with, curtail 
or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations”).  
 134. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 806.  
 135. Id.   
 136. Id.  In other words, a Kansas employee could truthfully comply with the employment 
verification system while refraining from making false information or committing identity theft.  
 137. Id.  
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a W-4 form.138  The majority explained that the mere fact that a state law may 
overlap with federal criminal law does not establish a case for preemption.139   
Accordingly, the majority rejected both the express and implied 
preemption arguments set forth by the respondents.140  The Court concluded 
that the State’s prosecutions were not preempted by the IRCA and reversed 
and remanded the judgments of the Kansas Supreme Court.141  
A. Concurring Opinion of Justice Thomas  
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, 
urged the Court to abandon its “purposes and objectives” implied conflict 
preemption jurisprudence.142  Justice Thomas argued that the doctrine has no 
constitutional basis143 and articulated that the Court must only hold that 
federal law preempts state law if the two “directly conflict.”144  Further, 
Justice Thomas also expressed skepticism about field preemption, 
specifically “as applied in the absence of a congressional command that a 
particular field be pre[]empted.”145 However, Justice Thomas conceded that 
the majority correctly applied the Court’s field preemption precedents in 
Garcia.146  
B. Opinion of Justice Breyer, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in 
Part   
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that state prosecutions of aliens for using 
fraudulent documents to convince their employers that they are eligible to 
 
 138. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7205).  
 139. Id.   
 140. Id. at 804, 806.  
 141. Id. at 807.  
 142. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 143. See id. at 807–08 (refusing to apply the “purposes and objectives” preemption doctrine 
because “it is contrary to the Supremacy Clause”).  But see Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, 
Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 167 
(2012) (discussing historical support for the doctrine of obstacle preemption).  
 144. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 
590 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)).  According to Justice Thomas’s “direct 
conflict” standard, preemption turns on whether the text of state and federal laws set forth 
conflicting commands.  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 590; Gilbert, supra note 143, at 163 n.56 (“Justice 
Thomas indicates that a direct conflict can exist not only when state law penalizes what federal law 
requires . . . . It may also exist where federal law authorizes a person to engage in certain actions 
prohibited by state law.” (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 589–91, 593–95)).  
 145. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 146. Id.   
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work are field preempted.147  The dissent explained that the IRCA makes its 
preemptive intent clear by (1) prohibiting states from using the I-9 form and 
the federal employment verification system to police work-authorization 
fraud, and (2) creating “a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of 
who is authorized to work” in this country, leaving no room for state laws to 
police work-authorization violations.148  Thus, the dissent reasoned that the 
Kansas prosecutions were preempted by the IRCA, as the prosecutions did 
exactly what Congress reserved to itself when it enacted the IRCA: “police 
fraud committed to demonstrate federal work authorization.”149  As an 
example, the dissent discussed the prosecution of Donaldo Morales and 
explained that Kansas’s “theory of guilt was that Morales intended to deceive 
his employer” into believing that he was authorized to work so that his 
employer, relying on the deception, “would give him a job.”150  Therefore, 
the dissent concluded that Kansas prosecuted Morales for work-authorization 
fraud “for the purpose of obtaining employment.”151 
IV. ANALYSIS  
In Garcia, the Supreme Court held that state prosecutions of 
unauthorized aliens for identity theft based on false information found in tax-
withholding forms that contain the same information as an I-9 form are not 
preempted by the IRCA.152  To begin, this Note does not take the position 
that the doctrine of field preemption should be eliminated.153  Rather, this 
Note argues that the Court correctly decided the case, as the holding 
preserved traditional state police powers where Congress had not clearly 
demonstrated an intent to preempt state authority.154  In doing so, the Court 
construed the IRCA to avoid absurdity155 and properly refrained from 
 
 147. Id. at 809 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The dissent also seems to 
consider obstacle preemption as a basis for preempting the Kansas prosecutions, and in doing so, 
the dissent discussed Arizona.  Id. at 809–10.  However, the dissent ultimately rested its preemption 
argument on field preemption, concluding that the IRCA “occupies the field of policing fraud 
committed to demonstrate federal work authorization.”  Id. at 810. 
 148. Id.    
 149. Id. at 811.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  However, the dissent explained that “[o]n different facts, there would have been no 
preemption.”  Id.  For example, had Kansas proved that Morales used the false Social Security 
number on his tax-withholding forms to induce a different type of reliance or obtain a different type 
of benefit, then the “IRCA would [have] permit[ted] the prosecution.”  Id.   
 152. Id. at 804, 806 (majority opinion).  
 153. See infra Section IV.A. 
 154. See infra Section IV.B. 
 155. See infra Section IV.C. 
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“judicial guesswork” into congressional purposes not clearly and manifestly 
expressed by the IRCA.156  
A. Falling Outside the Preempted Field Versus Eliminating Field 
Preemption Jurisprudence  
Justice Thomas has expressed skepticism towards the Court’s field 
preemption jurisprudence.157  To limit its expansive application, Justice 
Thomas would not apply field preemption “in the absence of statutory 
language expressly requiring it.”158  Other members of the Court have 
likewise objected to the scope of the Court’s field preemption 
jurisprudence.159  Moreover, some scholars go as far as to urge the Court to 
abandon the doctrine altogether.160  
This Note does not purport to suggest that the Court should abandon its 
field preemption jurisprudence.  Even the doctrine’s critics have been willing 
to apply it, although, admittedly, their reason for doing so may be influenced 
more by stare decisis than on the doctrine’s correctness.161  Nevertheless, this 
 
 156. See infra Section IV.D. 
 157. See, e.g., Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am . . . skeptical of field 
pre-emption . . . .”); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 616–17 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[F]ield pre-emption is itself suspect, at least as applied in the 
absence of a congressional command that a particular field be pre-empted.”).  Justice Thomas has 
similarly objected to the Court’s obstacle preemption jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 
808 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing obstacle preemption because it “impermissibly rests on 
judicial guesswork about ‘broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions 
of congressional purposes that are not contained within the text of federal law’” (quoting Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)); Arizona v. United 
States, 567 U.S. 387, 440 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining 
that obstacle preemption “is inconsistent with the Constitution because it invites courts to engage in 
freewheeling speculation about congressional purpose that roams well beyond statutory text”); 
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing obstacle preemption 
as “vague” and “potentially boundless” (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 
(2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 158. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 617.  
 159. See, e.g., Arizona, 567 U.S. at 423 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)  
(objecting to the majority’s expansive field preemption approach and arguing that “[i]mplicit ‘field 
preemption’ will not do” to eliminate the states’ inherent sovereign power). 
 160. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 811–
12 (1994) (arguing that field preemption is illegitimate); Kimberly K. Asano & Kamaile A. Nichols, 
Note, Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu: Demonstrating the Need 
to Abandon the Field Preemption Doctrine, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 501, 502 (2007) (contending that 
“the doctrine of field preemption should be abandoned” because it is “impractical in application and 
undermines federalism principles”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit 
Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 74–75 (2005) (“I think there should be only two situations 
when there is preemption of state law.  One is express preemption.  The other is when federal law 
and state law are mutually exclusive, so it is not possible for somebody to comply with both.”).  
 161. See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 628, 630–38 (2012) 
(illustrating Justice Thomas’s application of field preemption in which Justice Scalia joined).  
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Note takes the position that Garcia was correctly decided because the Court’s 
implied preemption analysis wisely recognized key policy considerations 
underlying state police powers and, by doing so, prevented field preemption 
from going too far.  One need not go so far as to challenge the legitimacy of 
the doctrine of field preemption.  
B. The Court Properly Recognized the States’ Historic Police Powers  
In preemption cases, the Court presumes that the historic police powers 
of the states are not superseded by a federal act unless “that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”162  Criminal law enforcement is a classic 
example of a state police power.163  This is because the purpose of state 
criminal law enforcement is to protect citizens’ health, safety, morals, and 
welfare.164  Since the founding of this country, “criminal law enforcement 
has been primarily a responsibility of the [s]tates,” which remains true 
today.165  Across the country, identity theft results in devastating financial 
loss and emotional distress for its victims.166  State identity theft laws address 
 
 162. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted).  Concern for 
federalism favors preservation of traditional state authority over local matters unless Congress has 
clearly taken away that authority.  Id. at 241 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  While historically the 
Supreme Court has discussed this “presumption against preemption,” recent Supreme Court cases 
have failed to apply it.  Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. 
L. REV. 967, 968, 971 (2002).  In fact, some scholars have argued that the Court’s analysis in recent 
preemption decisions “has, in effect, created a presumption in favor of preemption.”  Id. at 971; see 
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to 
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2004) (“Contrary to . . . [the Supreme Court’s] homage 
to the presumption against preemption, . . . recent Supreme Court preemption cases clearly put the 
presumption in favor of preemption.”); Gilbert, supra note 143, at 161 (explaining that there is a 
recent, emerging trend for the Court “to no longer explicitly apply the presumption against 
preemption, and in some cases, to do exactly the opposite—presume preemption”).   
 163. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (“[W]e can think of no better example 
of the police power, which the Founders denied the [n]ational [g]overnment and reposed in the 
[s]tates, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”).  
 164. For example, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., two entertainment establishments that wished 
to provide “totally nude dancing” sued to enjoin the enforcement of Indiana’s public indecency 
statute, which prohibited complete nudity in public places, on the grounds that the statute violated 
the First Amendment.  501 U.S. 560, 562–64 (1991).  The lower courts agreed with the 
entertainment establishments, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Indiana public 
indecency statute fell within the scope of the State’s police powers, as the statute “[was] designed 
to protect morals and public order.”  Id. at 569 (“The traditional police power of the [s]tates is 
defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and [the Court] ha[s] 
upheld such a basis for legislation.”). 
 165. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 806 (2020). 
 166. In 2016, of the 17.7 million persons age sixteen or older who experienced one or more 
incidents of identity theft resulting in a loss of $1 or more, the losses collectively totaled $17.5 
billion.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251147, Victims of Identity 
Theft, 2016 (2019).  Additionally, more than a third of victims who spent six months or more 
resolving the financial repercussions of identity theft experienced severe emotional distress.  Id.   
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this growing problem by protecting citizens from the fraudulent use of 
personal information.167   
The Kansas statutes at issue in Garcia, which protect the health and 
safety of citizens within the State from misuse of personal information, 
“address conduct . . . ‘deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.’”168  
Victims of misused personal data by unauthorized employees are directly 
harmed and often must spend months attempting to clear their names and 
fixing their damaged credit. 169  In the dissent’s view, rather than protecting a 
local interest, Kansas’s application of its criminal laws operated to police 
violations of the federal employment verification system.170  In reaching its 
conclusion, the dissent overlooked important policy considerations and 
erroneously relied on Arizona. 
In Arizona, the State had enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and 
Safe Neighborhoods Act (“S.B. 1070”).171  As part of the Act, Section 3 
imposed a state penalty on aliens for failing to obey federal alien-registration 
laws.172  The United States contended that the Arizona law intruded on the 
occupied field of alien registration, which Congress left no room for states to 
regulate.173  The Supreme Court agreed, explaining that the comprehensive 
 
 167. Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2016).  Compare State v. Martinez, 
896 N.W.2d 737, 766 (Iowa 2017) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“[Identity theft laws] cover certain 
categories of fraudulent conduct and operate in an area of traditional state police power.”), with 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (“Policing fraud against federal 
agencies is hardly ‘a field which the [s]tates have traditionally occupied’ . . . .” (quoting Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  
 168. Wis. Dep’t of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 291 (1986) (quoting San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243–44 (1959)).  
 169. For example, mother Camber Lybbert, after receiving news from her bank that her three-
year-old daughter’s Social Security number was on file for two credit cards and two auto loans, 
spent approximately thirty hours per week for four to five months scrambling to clear up her 
daughter’s credit history.  John Leland, Immigrants Stealing U.S. Social Security Numbers for Jobs, 
Not Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/04/world/americas/ 
04iht-id.2688618.html.  As it turned out, an illegal immigrant was using the child’s Social Security 
number to get a job.  Id.  Lybbert explained that “[the undocumented worker has] ruined the 
innocence of her [daughter’s] Social Security number because when [her daughter] goes to apply 
for loans, she’s going to have this history.”  Id.  Similarly, Los Angeles County police detective 
Adrian Flores also became a victim of identity theft and learned that one of the culprits was an 
undocumented immigrant working in Utah.  Anna Gorman, Theft of Identity Compounds the Crime, 
L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at B3.  While Flores, “[did not] lose any money . . . his damaged credit 
prevented him from buying a house[,] [a]nd the process to clear his name was long and difficult.”  
Id.   
 170. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 811 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra 
Section III.B.  
 171. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012).  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 400 (citing Brief for the United States at 27, 31, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 
387 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048, at *27, *31). 
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statutory framework for the registration of aliens demonstrates that Congress 
occupies the field of alien registration and that where Congress occupies an 
entire field, “even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”174  As 
a result, the Court held that Section 3 of S.B. 1070 was preempted by federal 
law.175   
Yet, the Kansas statutes at issue in Garcia are different from the 
challenged provision in Arizona.  Notably, in Arizona, the State’s purpose in 
enacting S.B. 1070 was to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and 
presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the 
United States.”176  Thus, Section 3 was an attempt to drive out unauthorized 
aliens from the State’s borders by enforcing federal alien-registration laws at 
the state level and imposing penalties for violations.  But, in Garcia, Kansas’s 
identity theft and false information statutes, as applied, did not impose 
penalties on unauthorized aliens for committing fraud to demonstrate federal 
work authorization.   
Rather, the Kansas laws and prosecutions imposed criminal sanctions 
for stealing personal identifying information belonging to another person.177  
Kansas utilized its police powers, not to prosecute unauthorized aliens for 
immigration violations, but to address the identity theft problem within its 
borders.  Indeed, while S.B. 1070 targeted noncitizens, the Kansas statutes 
are criminal laws of general applicability, applying to citizens and 
noncitizens alike.  That is to say, even if “Congress has 
occupied . . . the . . . field of policing fraud committed to demonstrate federal 
work authorization[,]”178 Kansas’s application of its identity theft laws to 
unauthorized aliens who use false identities on tax-withholding forms, where 
the same information is also contained in an I-9 form, falls outside of that 
field.  Contrary to the dissent’s assertion that Kansas applied its laws to 
prosecute the respondents for misrepresenting their federal work 
authorization, the State actually prosecuted the respondents for identity theft 
and making false information by fraudulently using other individuals’ 
information on their tax-withholding forms.   
Although conceding that the IRCA has created a comprehensive scheme 
whereby Congress has taken from the states the power to police fraud 
committed to demonstrate federal work authorization,179 it cannot be said that 
 
 174. Id. at 401.  
 175. Id. at 403.  
 176. Id. at 393.  
 177. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6107(a)(1) (2019). 
 178. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 808 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 179. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5), (d)(2)(F) (limiting the states’ use of the I-9 form and the 
employment verification system); 131 CONG. REC. 23,317 (1985) (aiming to reduce the availability 
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Congress has similarly demonstrated a clear intent to preempt states from 
prosecuting unauthorized aliens for using fraudulent information on 
employment-related documents, unrelated to work authorization.  Nothing in 
the IRCA’s “text, . . . structure, context, [or] purpose”180 alludes to, much 
less demonstrates, a “clear and manifest” intent to prohibit states from 
applying their laws to prosecute individuals for identity theft or making false 
information.  
In the absence of a “clear and manifest” intent on the part of Congress 
demonstrating that the IRCA should have preemptive effect on specific 
applications of state identity theft and making false information laws, 
federalism favored upholding historic state police powers.181  To hold 
otherwise would be an inappropriate intrusion on the exercise of state police 
powers in criminal law enforcement that has historically been conceded to 
the states, as well as inconsistent with the federal system.   
C. The Court Wisely Interpreted the IRCA to Avoid Absurdity  
In preemption analyses, “[c]ongressional purpose is . . . ‘the ultimate 
touchstone.’”182  Courts prefer to interpret a statute in a manner that leads to 
logical results in order to prevent an absurd meaning the legislature did not 
intend.183  However, the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 
1324a(b)(5) would result in strange consequences.184  If the United States 
Supreme Court had affirmed the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the provision, any information “contained in” the I-9 form could not be used 
by any person185 for any purpose other than those listed in the provision.186  
However, this interpretation would lead to bizarre results.187  For example, 
even if an employee truthfully stated his name on an I-9 form, his employer 
could neither cut him a paycheck with that name, nor could his sister use his 
name to mail him a card.188  Surely Congress did not intend those results.   
 
of employment in the United States to illegal immigrants by establishing an employment 
verification system).   
 180. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 181. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 182. Wis. Dep’t of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 290 (1986) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. 
v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985)). 
 183. See Christina Gomez, Canons of Statutory Construction, 46 COLO. LAW., Feb. 2017, at. 23, 
25 (“[C]ourts have held that . . . statutes should be construed to avoid absurd results the legislature 
could not have intended.”).  
 184. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 803. 
 185. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) applies not only to states but also to the federal government and 
private citizens.  Id. at 802. 
 186. Id. at 800. 
 187. Id. at 803.  
 188. Id.  
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It may be countered that there is a narrower reading to the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s interpretation and that the federal government would not 
have an interest in prohibiting individual uses of personal information 
“contained in” the I-9 form for the purposes illustrated.  Further, the Kansas 
Supreme Court itself suggested “that its interpretation applied only to the 
prosecution of aliens for using a false identity to establish ‘employment 
eligibility.’”189  Nevertheless, that (1) the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
interpretation, if read literally, could produce such results, (2) such 
limitations are not found within the text of Section 1324a(b)(5),190 and (3) the 
structure and purpose of the IRCA (i.e., to combat the employment of illegal 
aliens) does not support these broad results, all suggest that the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s interpretation is inconsistent with Congress’s intent with 
respect to the scope of the limitation provision.  
Moreover, the heading of Section 1324a(b)(5), which reads “[l]imitation 
on use of attestation form,”191 further supports a finding that Congress did 
not express a “clear and manifest” intent to preempt state identity theft 
prosecutions with respect to misused personal information by unauthorized 
aliens on employment documents.  Although “headings are not commanding, 
they supply cues” of what Congress intended “to sweep within its reach.”192  
Here, “attestation form” refers to the statutory requirement that a prospective 
employee attest on the “form designated or established by the Attorney 
General,” i.e., the I-9 form,193 that they are authorized to work in the United 
States, and that an employer attest on the same form that they have reviewed 
the requisite document(s) produced by the prospective employee.194  Thus, 
the language “[l]imitation on use of attestation form” cannot reasonably be 
understood to indicate a congressional intent to limit a state’s use of tax-
withholding forms.  If Congress did in fact intend to expressly preempt states 
from using fraudulent tax-withholding forms as the basis for prosecuting 
unauthorized aliens, it used the most inconspicuous language to do so.  As 
such, the most appropriate reading of Section 1324a(b)(5) is that Congress 
intended to create a “use limitation” on the I-9 form rather than a sweeping 
“information-use preemption.”195 
 
 189. Id. (quoting State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588, 596 (Kan. 2017)). 
 190. Id. 
 191. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5). 
 192. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 540 (2015).  
 193. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2) (2019) (establishing the I-9 form).   
 194. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)–(D), (2). 
 195. Brief for the Petitioner at 28, Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020) (No. 17-834), 2019 
WL 2296765, at *28 (quoting State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588, 604 (Kan. 2017) (Biles, J., dissenting), 
rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020)).   
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Lastly, the Kansas statutes are neutral, applying to both aliens and 
United States citizens.  Had the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
holding of the Kansas Supreme Court, only United States citizens could be 
prosecuted by states for using fraudulent tax-withholding documents 
containing the same information as found in an I-9 form.  Unauthorized aliens 
would be immune from prosecution for the same conduct—only held 
accountable at the whim of the federal government.196  Although this 
observation rings true whenever federal law preempts state law, such an 
outcome would have been inappropriate in Garcia where the State utilized 
its police powers to address a local problem.  This is because the State would 
be rendered unable to fully eliminate an inherently local injury, unrelated to 
any federal policy.197  
D. The Court Rightly Refrained from “Judicial Guesswork” Following 
Arizona  
When a federal act contains an express preemption clause, the Court 
focuses on the plain language of that clause as evidence of congressional 
intent.198  While preemption analysis requires ascertaining congressional 
intent, the Court has said that legislative history, alone, is insufficient to 
establish preemptive intent.199  Moreover, the Court has explained that 
“unenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws.”200  Rather, the Court 
has consistently looked to the text of federal statutes as the principal authority 
for finding, or not finding, a basis for preemption.201   
 
 196. State v. Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 761 (Iowa 2017) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).   
 197. See supra Section IV.B. 
 198. Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011); see also Gomez, supra note 183, 
at 23 (“[T]he starting point in construing a statute . . . is the plain meaning of the text.”).  
 199. P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petrol. Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501 (1988); see also 
Whiting, 563 U.S. at 599 (“Congress’s ‘authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the 
legislative history.’” (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 
(2005))).  
 200. Isla Petrol. Corp., 485 U.S. at 501.  At the same time, this is not the view taken by every 
judge or legal scholar and remains a massive debate in statutory interpretation.  Compare, e.g., John 
F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 76–77, 102, 
105, 111 (2006) (arguing that the purposivist approach to statutory interpretation, which gives 
priority to policy context, completely ignores the legislative process and makes it difficult for 
legislators to articulate boundary lines for legislation, because political minorities cannot rely upon 
the statutory text “as a predictable means for setting the desirable limits on bills” they are only 
willing to assent to “upon the acceptance of bargained-for conditions”), with Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7, 57 (2013) (defending purposivist statutory 
interpretation on the grounds that it is necessary to “the task of fashioning a workable legal system”).  
However, it is beyond the scope of this Note to resolve this ongoing scholarly debate.   
 201. See Isla Petrol. Corp., 485 U.S. at 501 (upholding the tax and regulation on the grounds 
that there was no enacted statutory text to support a preemptive intent); see also Whiting, 563 U.S. 
at 594–95, 598 (finding that the IRCA expressly preserves the states’ ability to impose sanctions 
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For example, in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,202 the Court intently 
focused on the language of the savings clause203 within the express 
preemption provision of Section 1324a(h)(2).204  Based on its plain text, the 
Court concluded that an Arizona law allowing Arizona courts to suspend or 
revoke business licenses of employers who knowingly or intentionally hire 
unauthorized aliens was not preempted by the IRCA.205  Furthermore, in 
Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.,206 the 
Court upheld regulations on gasoline and petroleum products enacted by the 
Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs on the grounds that there was 
absolutely no text to attach a preemptive intent of a federally mandated free-
market.207 
However, in Arizona, the Court diverged from its previous rulings 
regarding a federal act’s legislative history and solely relied on the legislative 
history of the IRCA as the basis for striking down a state law.208  Such a 
divergence is problematic, as “[u]nder the Supremacy Clause, pre-emptive 
effect is to be given to congressionally enacted laws, not to judicially divined 
legislative purposes.”209  It is sheer guesswork for a court to attempt to 
 
through licensing laws on employers of unauthorized workers); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 233 (1947) (holding that the text of the amended United States Warehouse Act clearly 
gave exclusive authority to the Secretary of Agriculture over persons licensed under the Act).  
 202. 563 U.S. 582 (2011).  
 203. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “saving[s] clause” as “[a] statutory provision exempting 
from coverage something that would otherwise be included.”  Saving clause, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  Accordingly, although Congress has restricted the states’ ability to 
combat the employment of unauthorized workers, the IRCA includes a savings clause, or exception, 
for sanctions imposed “through [state] licensing and similar laws.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2018).  
As such, Congress explicitly saved the states’ power to enforce “licensing and similar laws” against 
employers of unauthorized aliens, which would otherwise have been preempted.  
 204. Whiting, 563 U.S. at 594–96; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (“[T]his section preempt[s] any 
[s]tate or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar 
laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”). 
 205. Whiting, 563 U.S. at 599.  
 206. 485 U.S. 495 (1988).  
 207. Id. at 501, 503.  
 208. As part of S.B. 1070, § 5(C) made it a misdemeanor for “an unauthorized alien ‘to 
knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or 
independent contractor’” in the State of Arizona.  Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 403 
(2012) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2010)).  While the IRCA imposes sanctions 
on employers who knowingly employ unauthorized aliens or fail to comply with the employment 
verification system, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1), it is silent as to whether additional penalties may be 
imposed against employees, Arizona, 567 U.S. at 406.  Ultimately, the Court held that the “Arizona 
law would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized 
employment of aliens.”  Id.  The Court explained that “[t]he legislative background of [the] IRCA 
underscores the fact that Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on 
aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment” and that the states could not make 
criminal what Congress did not.  Id. at 405–06.  
 209. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 440 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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decipher the subjective thoughts motivating the members of Congress at the 
moment they adopt or reject a bill or provision.  For example, Congress’s 
rejection of a provision including criminal penalties for employees in Arizona 
could have also been reasonably understood as the antithesis.210   
In Garcia, the Court properly refrained from such “judicial 
guesswork.”211  Similar to Congress’s silence regarding whether states may 
impose additional penalties on unauthorized employees in Arizona, the IRCA 
regulates the use of the I-9 form and appended documents but says nothing 
about the use of other documents for law enforcement purposes.212  The 
Garcia court did not engage in “atextual speculation about legislative 
intentions,”213 and instead rightly upheld the Kansas statutes.  
It may be urged that the Court’s absurdity analysis in Garcia is itself 
“judicial guesswork.”214  However, highlighting and rejecting the bizarre 
potential consequences of the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Section 1324a(b)(5) is a far cry from a “freewheeling”215 speculation into 
congressional purposes.  Certainly, when presented with a state’s 
interpretation of a federal statute, one cannot expect the Court to forego all 
common sense and understanding of English language conventions in 
ascertaining its meaning. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Garcia, the Supreme Court held that the IRCA does not preempt 
states from prosecuting unauthorized aliens for identity theft or other similar 
statutes based on false information found in documents independent of the I-
9 form.216  The Court correctly decided the case because the holding 
preserves historic state police powers in a traditional area of criminal law 
enforcement where Congress lacked a “clear and manifest” purpose to 
preempt.217  By rejecting the interpretation of the Kansas Supreme Court, the 
 
 210. Id. at 433 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There is no more reason to 
believe that this rejection was expressive of a desire that there be no sanctions on employees, than 
expressive of a desire that such sanctions be left to the [s]tates.”); see also supra note 200 
(discussing legislative compromise).  
 211. See Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 808 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that 
“‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption impermissibly rests on judicial guesswork about ‘broad 
federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that 
are not contained within the text of federal law’”) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)).  
 212. Id. at 798 (majority opinion).  
 213. Id. at 808 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 214. Id.; see supra Section IV.C. 
 215. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 216. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 804, 806.  
 217. See supra Section IV.B. 
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Court properly construed the IRCA to prevent strange and absurd results 
from occurring.218  Finally, the Court refrained from inquiring solely into 
congressional purposes outside of the IRCA’s text after deviating off course 
in Arizona.219   
 
 
 218. See supra Section IV.C.  
 219. See supra Section IV.D.  
